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Credit affects the economy via various channels: its price, collateral requirements and the 
extent of rationing. Would the intensity of monetary transmission be affected by the 
market structure of the credit industry? Using a spatial competition framework I 
demonstrate how credit market structure can affect the transmission of monetary policy 
changes into real activity via the volume of credit. The paper also points that monetary 
tightening may render lending unprofitable and consequently beget a credit crunch; the 
extent of credit market robustness to contractive monetary policy is shown to depend on 
its structural characteristics. (JEL E58, E59, G18, G20) 
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  11. INTRODUCTION 
The literature identifies a number of channels by which the banking system 
transmits monetary policy changes. Alongside the traditional Keynesian and monetarist 
bank liabilities channel more recent theories emphasize the role of bank assets, stemming 
from credit market informational imperfections and banks’ informational advantages as 
credit providers (see Allan S. Blinder and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1983), Ben S. Bernanke and 
Cara Lown (1991), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Costas Azariadis and Bruce D. Smith 
(1993), Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist (1994), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Allan H. 
Meltzer (1995), Javier Suarez and Oren Sussman (1997, 1999) and Anil K. Kashyap and 
Jeremy C. Stein (2000)). Bank loans affect the economy via their price, collateral 
requirements, borrowers’ net worth and the extent of rationing – all of which are shown 
in the banking system structure-performance literature to be affected by the extent of 
competition between banks (see Marco Pagano  (1993), Mitchell A. Petersen and 
Raghuram M. Rajan  (1995) and Nicola Cetorelli  (1997, 2001)). Combining the 
arguments raised by the credit channel literature with the ones broached by the banking 
system structure-performance literature leads to the hypothesis that banking system 
structure may, via its effects on credit accessibility, affect the intensity of the credit 
channel.  
The idea that bank market structure can affect the effectiveness of monetary policy 
was initially developed by Florin Aftalion and Lawrence J.  White (1977) and 
subsequently by David D. Vanhoose (1983). Both studies derive and contrast the effects of 
  2two polar banking system structures - monopoly and competition - on the pass-through of 
changes in various monetary policy tools to deposit and loan rates. In both studies banking 
system structure figures as an exogenous parameter.  Vanhoose (1985) examines the effect 
of a change in the number of banks on the Central Bank’s ability to control a monetary 
aggregate, focusing on the market for bank deposits, where banks are engaged in Cournot 
competition. These works suggest that the competitive configuration of the banking 
system can affect monetary transmission and the choice of the monetary policy tool.  
The creation of the European Monetary Union stirred anew the interest in the 
implications of financial system structure in general, and banking system structure in 
particular, on the pass-through of monetary policy changes. Since EMU member countries 
differ dramatically with respect to banking system structure (Kashyap & Stein (1997) find 
considerable heterogeneity in the characteristics of banking systems across European 
countries), the prospective effects of bank market configuration on monetary transmission 
may entail important policy implications for the ECB. Stephen G. Cecchetti (1999) argues 
that the differences in financial system structure between EMU countries are the primary 
cause for the asymmetries that these countries exhibit with respect to monetary policy 
transmission. In his empirical study, Mojon (2000) shows that the deregulation of 
European banking system enhanced the transmission of monetary policy changes to bank 
credit and deposit rates and that greater competition in the banking system reduces the 
“interest rate cycle asymmetry” of the pass-through.      
Some authors have examined the causality running from monetary stance to banking 
  3system structure. Fabio C. Bagliano, Alberto Dalmazzo and Giancarlo Marini (2000) and 
Linda A.  Toolesma (2003) suggest that the choice of a monetary policy rule by the 
Central Bank affects the extent of competition in the market for bank loans. Toolsema 
(2003) shows that tight monetary policy impedes banks’ ability to charge a lending rate 
above the Central Bank’s policy rate; in Bagliano et al. (2000) monetary contraction 
favors collusion.  
This paper’s aim is to examine the way by which credit market structure (henceforth 
CMS) affects the short run transmission of monetary policy changes into real economic 
activity
3. The analytical framework used for this purpose is a one period model of the 
market for credit, based on Steven C. Salop’s (1979)  circular model for spatial 
competition. Salop’s model is a standard tool for modeling imperfect competition, and its 
application to the banking system is by no means a new one. David Besanko and Anjan 
Thakor (1992) use it to model the implications of banking deregulation; Carmen Matutes 
and Jorge A. Padilla (1994) apply it for analyzing bank network compatibility; Pierre-
Andre Chiappori, David Perez-Castrillo and Thierry Verdier (1995) make use of it in 
their investigation of the effects of deposit rates regulation on the size and structure of the 
banking system; Jan Boukaert and Hans Degryse (1995) and Degryse (1996) use it to 
examine the banking competition consequences of providing bank customers with remote 
access to banking services and Toolsema (2003) applies it for analyzing the effects of 
                                                  
3 Banks provide both deposit and credit services, yet the structural-competitive characteristics of the 
markets for these two types of services are not necessarily identical. In view of this paper’s focus on the 
market for credit, I favor the term “credit market structure” over “bank market structure”.   
  4different monetary policy rules on the banking system’s Lerner index.   
In this study, CMS is captured by two parameters which, due to the focus on short-run 
analysis, are treated as exogenous: the number of banks in the economy (whose inverse is 
the index for banking system concentration), and borrowers’ per unit “transportation cost”, 
which is an index for the extent of differentiation between banks as credit providers. The 
latter parameter can be seen as summarizing various differentiating factors such as banks’ 
deliberate long-run product differentiation strategies (specialization in lending to 
particular industries, market niches, etc.), credit market frictions, actual transportation 
costs, the technological state-of-the-art of the banking industry, banking system 
regulation, etc. Assuming that the so-called transportation costs are incurred by borrowers, 
the existence of such differentiating factors casts differentiation between borrowers with 
respect to credit accessibility.  
The Central Bank’s monetary policy tool is the discount window rate, and as a 
simplifying assumption, the discount window is always open
4. Commercial banks procure 
liquidity from the Central Bank (there is no interbank market
5) and offer loan contracts to 
entrepreneurs, who seek external funding for their projects and are assumed to have no 
alternative source of funding. The credit market is subjected to asymmetric information 
regarding entrepreneurs’ credit worthiness.  
The model yields either a separating equilibrium – in which unproductive 
                                                  
4 This can be thought of as analogous to a monetary regime where the Central Bank conducts open market 
operations designed to achieve a pre-announced funds’ rate target.  
5 In reality, the Central Bank lends funds to commercial banks only in the margin. This simplifying 
assumption would therefore not affect the model’s qualitative results.    
  5entrepreneurs are screened out – or a pooling equilibrium. Within each equilibrium, 
banks are endogenously configured as either monopolistic competitors or local 
monopolists, depending not only on the structural parameters - the number of banks and 
the extent of differentiation between them as credit providers – but also on the Central 
Bank’s discount window rate. It is shown that when the banks assume the behavior of 
local monopolists, monetary policy changes affect the economy via a CMS-driven 
lending channel. Another result is that the more concentrated and differentiated the 
market for credit, the larger the decline in the discount window rate required for the 
achievement of a given expansionary effect. The model also shows that in the case of 
pooling loan contracts, monetary tightening may render credit extension unprofitable, 
thus inducing banks to withhold lending - so that the economy undergoes a credit crunch. 
The Central Bank therefore has an active role in assuring the viability and proper 
functioning of the credit market. Since it is plausible to assume that monetary 
policymakers would refrain from policy actions that are bound to generate a credit 
crunch, it can be cautiously argued that the vulnerability of the credit market to monetary 
tightening casts a constraint on monetary policy. CMS is shown to affect the extent to 
which the credit market is robust to contractive monetary policy (although the direction 
of the effect varies), which provides yet additional grounds for the relevance of CMS to 
monetary policy. 
The paper is organized as follows: section I presents the theoretical framework; 
section II present and analyses the case where banks can offer separating loan contracts; 
  6section III present and analyses the case where banks can offer only pooling loan 
contracts and section IV concludes.  
2. THE MODEL 
I consider a one period economy, represented by the unit circumference circle. The 
economy is populated by entrepreneurs whose consumption takes place in the end of the 
period. A single good serves as both consumption and capital good. n profit maximizing 
banks are located symmetrically around the circle. The banks borrow funds from the 
Central Bank and offer loans to entrepreneurs.  
Entrepreneurs 
A continuum of entrepreneurs is located around the circle, each endowed with 
illiquid wealth that can be liquidized in the end of the period into w units of capital. 
Entrepreneurs differ with respect to entrepreneurial skills: there are productive (type h) 
and unproductive (type l) entrepreneurs. The proportion of type h entrepreneurs in the 
population is q.  
 
Technology 
Production is carried out through projects. At the beginning of the period, each 
entrepreneur faces the opportunity to start a project that requires the investment of one 
unit of capital. If the entrepreneur is of type h, the project yields R units of good in the 
end of the period. If the entrepreneur is of type l, she extracts a private gain of G units of 
capital from the project, which eventually generates no output.  
  7Assumption 1:  R  >  1 >  G > 0. 
Assumption 2: Even if entrepreneurs’ wealth had been liquid, they would have not been 
able to finance their projects, that is, w < 1. 
 
The Credit Market 
As entrepreneurs do not possess any liquid assets, an entrepreneur who wishes to start 
a project has to borrow the required investment of one unit of capital from a bank 
(commercial banks are the only lenders in the economy). A typical loan contract specifies 
the loan’s interest rate and collateral requirements. If a borrower fails to repay the loan, 
the bank seizes the collateral. Let {r
i , c




i denote the gross interest rate and collateral requirements, respectively. 
Loan contracts are not distance-contingent.  
Assumption 3: Entrepreneurial skills are private information.    
Potential borrowers bear a transportation disutility equivalent to α units of capital per 
unit of length. The parameter α measures the extent of differentiation between banks as 
perceived by potential borrowers: the higher α, the higher the extent of differentiation. 
Consider a type t∈{h , l} entrepreneur located x∈{0, 1/n} units of length away from 
bank i, then αx
 is the cost that she has to incur in order to access bank i's credit. Hence, 
the higher α and/or the larger the distance between a potential borrower and a given 
bank, the higher the cost of credit accessibility that she faces when applying for that 
particular bank’s credit. Since both banks and entrepreneurs are distributed around the 
  8circle, the latter differ with respect to credit accessibility.  
The cost of accessing credit can be thought of as reflecting the cumulative effects of 
various factors such as banks’ deliberate medium/long run strategic choices 
(specialization in lending to particular industries
6 local credit markets or market-niches), 
the supply of services other than loans such as thrift, auditing and consultancy, the degree 
of potential borrowers’ informational opaqueness, the technological state-of-the-art of the 
banking industry (the use of sophisticated technological tools by financial institutions is 
likely to diminish the extent of differentiation between banks), the effects of banking 
supervision – and last but not least - actual geographical distance and transportation 
costs.   
Empirical studies indicate that the actual distance between firms and banks is highly 
relevant to the price and availability of bank commercial credit. Timothy H. Hannan 
(1991) presents evidence pointing at the local nature of the market for bank loans. 
Kenneth P. Brevoort & Hannan (2004) find that distance negatively affects the likelihood 
of a local commercial loan being made and that this effect consistently increases the 
smaller the size of the bank; the bulk of their findings indicate that the importance of 
distance is increasing in U.S local market lending. Degryse & Steven Ongena (2005) 
present empirical results showing that geographical distance between firms, the lending 
bank and other banks in the vicinity affect loan conditions. Moreover, from a variety of 
                                                  
6 The unit circumference circle can be thought of as a spectrum of industries where each bank specializes 
in lending to a specific industry. In this sense, the farther the location of an entrepreneur from a given 
bank, the higher the cost that the bank incurs when evaluating that entrepreneur’s loan application. 
Assuming that banks charge loan applicants for the cost of evaluating their applications, a potential 
borrower’s cost of accessing a given bank’s credit will be higher the longer the distance between them. 
  9exercises they infer that transportation costs are the primary cause for spatial price 
discrimination they observe. They also find that distance remained an important factor in 
determining the price and availability of credit over their sample period (1975 – 1997) – 
a finding indicating that technological developments in communication and travel have 
not yet diminished the relevance of distance in the Belgian credit market.  
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Let bank i's closest neighbor be denoted bank o; then, the entrepreneur is interested in 
th aw rom bank i can attain by accepting the bank’s loan contract, then: 






borrowing from bank i if she considers the loan contract it offers to be both beneficial 
and preferable to the one offered by bank o, that is, if  ) (x V
i
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Let 
i x denote the location of a type t entrepreneur is indifferent  star t  that     between ting 
her c  proje t using bank i's funding to giving it up, then 
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Let  denote the location of  n 
contracts offered by bank i and bank o, then  marks the border of bank i's potential 
polistic competition market (to the right and to the left). By definition,  = 
i
t x ˆ   a type t entrepreneur that is indifferent between the loa
mono
i
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t x ˆ  bank i faces an actual monopoly market, whereas when 
i
t x ˆ ≤
i
t x  it 
faces an actual monopolistic competition market. Substituting equations (2) and (3) into 


















































                                                                             (5b)   
Other things being equal, the loan contract offered by a bank determines the location of 
its marginal borrower, and thereby 
) =   denote the demand for loans addressed to bank   h l 
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entrepreneurs, who never 
Since type h entrepreneurs always repay their loans, they are indifferent to collateral 
requirements and are concerned only by debitory rates; type l 
repay their loans, are concerned only by collateral requirements
7.  
                                                  
l
workable approximation to a more realistic yet cumbersome structure, in which type h entrepreneurs are 
7 The assumption that type h borrowers always repay their loans while type   borrowers always default is a 
characterized by a high probability to succeed and therefore, to repay their loans, whereas type l 
entrepreneurs have a low probability to succeed and therefore, are more likely to default. Assuming 
entrepreneurs are conscious of their chances to succeed, type h entrepreneurs’ borrowing decisions will be 
more sensitive to interest rates than to collateral requirements, whereas type l entrepreneurs’ borrowing 
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Equilibrium Collateral Levels 
rivate information and type l entrepreneurs never repay 
the
Proposition 1: Equilibrium loan contracts are either separating or pooling, depending 
As entrepreneurial talent is p
ir loans, the credit market suffers from adverse selection on the part of type l 
entrepreneurs. As in Helmut Bester (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987), collateral 
can be used as a screening and loss-minimizing device.  
 
on the comparative values of the parameters G and w. (i) If G≤w, banks offer separating 
loan contracts stipulating an equilibrium collateral level 
s c =  (the superscript s stands 
for “separating”). (ii) If G>w, banks offer pooling loan contracts (if any) stipulating an 
equilibrium collateral requirement 
p c = w (the superscript p stands for “pooling”). 
 
G
Proof: Since type l entrepreneurs always default on their loans, banks would rather 
corresponding optimal collateral level is  =G
8. If, alternatively, w <  , collateral 
screen away such borrowers. To discourage all type l entrepreneurs from applying for its 
loans, a bank has to set a collateral level that exceeds the private gain that a type l 
entrepreneur extracts from her project. Such a policy is feasible only if G≤w and its 
s c G
                                                                                                                                                  
decisions will be affected to a greater extent by collateral requirements than by interest rates.       
8 Although the bank can require borrowers to pledge any collateral between G and w, there is no point in 
requiring collateral higher than G. Given that any collateral level higher than G will be as good as G in 
terms of screening out type l borrowers, it is assumed that the equilibrium level of collateral is G.       
  13cannot serve as a means of screening borrowers; it can nevertheless be used to minimize 
losses. To discourage as many type l entrepreneurs as possible from borrowing and to 
minimize the losses inflicted by lending to those who remain undiscouraged, the banks 
will require borrowers to pledge the highest feasible collateral - their entire wealth. The 
equilibrium collateral level under pooling loan contracts will therefore be 
p c =w
9. As 
will be shown later in section III, banks may rather withhold credit altogether than offer 
pooling loan contracts: if banks’ potential losses from lending to type l entrepreneurs 
outweigh their potential gains from lending to type h  ones they will refrain from 
providing credit to borrowers.  
 
3. EQUILIBRIUM IN THE CASE OF SEPARATING LOAN CONTRA   
redit market equilibrium 
iscount 




Banks can borrow any amount of funds from the Central Bank at a gross d
window rate φ. The process b
per; φ is therefore treated as a parameter. Let bank i's profit under separating loan 






i r x L s  and let 
i r , 
i r ˆ  and 
i r ~  denote bank i's 
debitory rates for which 
i x
i  
i < h<   h x ˆ , h x ˆ i x   h and 
i x =
i
h , respectively. By definition,  h x ˆ
i r > , 
o r n R − − / 2 α
i r ~ =  and 
o r n R − − / 2 α
i r ˆ <   i's aximization 
       
o r n R − − / 2 α . Bank   profit m
                                           
9 As will be shown in section III, banks may rather withhold credit altogether than offer pooling loan 
contracts: if banks’ potential losses from lending to type l entrepreneurs outweigh their potential gains 
from lending to type h ones, they will refrain from providing credit to borrowers.  
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Solving (8) and using the symmetry between banks yields the f











































                                                  
(9)    
Lemma 1: The comparative values of the compound structural parameter α/n, projects’ 
output, R, and the discount window rate, φ , determine the competitive configuration
the credit market: α/n ≤ 2/3(R-φ) generates a monopolistic competition configuration; 
α/n ≥ R-φ yields a local monopolies configuration and 2/3(R-φ) < α/n <  R-φ produces a 





hybrid configuration - a convergence of the monopolistic competition and the local 
monopolies configurations. 
Substituting for 
s r , 
s r ~  and 





























































h x ~  
hybrid case, in which 
denotes the distance between a bank and its marginal type h borrower in the 
 and 
s
h x ˆ s



















h                                               0’) 
nds solely 
on the number of banks in the system , whereas under local monopolies it is invariant to 
n. Furthermore, the amplitude of a bank’s market under local monopolies is smaller than 
                                                (1
A bank’s market region occupies 
s
h x 2  units of length. Thus, the amplitude of a bank’s 
market under the hybrid and the monopolistic competition configurations depe
, n
1/n. Given banks’ symmetric distribution around the circle, it follows that every two 
neighboring local monopolies are separated from one another by a buffer zone of 
α φ) ( ) / 1 ( − − R n  units of length. As the number of banks in the system increases, 
individual markets remain unchanged, yet the buffer zones narrow. When the number of 
banks reaches  ) /( φ α − R  the buffer zones disappear. Figure 1 provides a mapping of credit 
market equilibrium configurations under separating loan contracts.  
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Figure 1.  A Mapping of Credit Market Equilibria under Separating Loan
Contracts 
 
The real effects of monetary policy under separating loan contracts 





















Equation (11) implies that under both the hybrid and the monopolistic competition 
configurations all type h entrepreneurs borrow, whereas under local monopolies only part 
of them do. The explanation is straightforward: the local monopolies configuration is the 
only one that introduces buffer zones between the markets of neighboring banks; type h 
  17entrepreneurs that are located within these buffer zones do not borrow.  
Given that the economy-wide population of type h entrepreneurs is q, the number of 
type h borrowers, and hence, the number of projects established in the beginning of the 
period, is 
s
h qb . By the end of the period these projects mature and yield R units of good 
each. Let 
s y  represent the economy’s total output, then, using equation (11): 








s , 1 min
φ
                                                                                            (12)   
 
Proposition 2: (i) Under both the monopolistic competition and the hybrid 
onfigurations all type h entrepreneurs borrow, so that output reaches its maximal level 
 
ket is segmented into local monopolies, the 
entral Bank can expand the economy’s output by lowering the discount window rate. 
the hybrid and the 
onopolistic competition configurations output attains its maximal level of Rq units of 
c
of Rq units of good. (ii) Under the local monopolies configuration only a proportion (R-
φ)/(α/n) < 1 of type h entrepreneurs borrow, so that output is inferior to its maximal level 
and mounts to Rq(R-φ)/(α/n) units of good.  
Proposition 3: (i) Whenever the credit mar
C
(ii) The larger the extent of differentiation between banks, α, the larger the decline in the 
discount window rate that generates a given expansionary effect.     
 
Proof: Corollary (i): according to proposition 2, under both 
m
  18good, which is invariant to φ. Therefore, monetary policy cannot generate real effects 
within these configurations. Under local monopolies, however, output is inferior to its 
maximal level and is negatively related to the discount window rate; thus a reduction 
(augmentation) of the discount window rate generates economic expansion (contraction). 
Corollary (ii): let 
s y  denote output under local monopolies, then  α φ / / Rqn y
s − = ∂ ∂ . 
Hence a change in the discount window rate induces a change in the opposite direction in 
s y . Since 
2 ) / /( ) / / n Rq n y
s α α φ = ∂ ∂ , the more differentiated a e 
credit market, the milder the negative effect that a given rise in the discount window rate 
rs on 
( ∂ nd concentrated th
bea
s y outcome is simple. Under local monopolies, a 
single bank’s market range is (R-φ)/α. Hence, the higher α, the milder the negative effect 
of a given rise in φ on a single bank’s market region and thereby on the number of type h 
entrepreneurs that borrower from it and the output they produce. The fewer the number of 
banks in the economy, the weaker the economy-wide manifestation of an increase in φ on 
the overall volume of type h borrowers and on output. Thus, the more differentiated and 
concentrated the credit market, the milder the real effect of a given change in the discount 
window rate. Alternatively, the more differentiated and concentrated the credit market, 
the larger the change in the discount window rate required for the achievement of a given 
real effect.  
Figure 2 provides a mapping of output levels under separating loan contracts. The 
downward sl
. The explanation for this 
opping lines projecting in a fan-like pattern from the point (0 , R) across the 
  19local monopolies zone are iso-output lines. An iso-output line depicts all the 
combinations of φ  and α/n that sustain a given level of output
10. Higher iso-output lines 
correspond to lower output levels: the highest iso-output line corresponds to zero output 
whereas the lowest iso-output line corresponds to the maximal level of output, Rq units 
of good. Note that the lowest iso-output line traces the border between the hybrid and the 
local monopolies zones; all combinations of φ  and α/n  that fall below it sustain the 
maximal level of output. The iso-output line that corresponds to an output of 
s y0 units of 





φ ⋅ − =
0                                                                                                                  (13) 
Equation (13) entails monetary policy implications: 
roposition 4: (i)  When the credit market is segmented into local monopolies, the 
 
P
preservation of a given output level 
s y0 requires that a unit rise in  α/n be compensated 
for by a  Rq y
s / 0  < 1 units drop in the discount window rate. (ii) The higher the level of 
output to be sustained, the larger the extent by which the discount window rate has to fall 
in order to compensate for a unit rise in  α/n.  
 
                                                  
10 Note that at the point φ =R the level of output is undetermined. 
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Figure 2: A Mapping of Output Levels under Separating Loan Contracts 
 
 
4. EQUILIBRIUM IN THE CASE OF POOLING LOAN CONTRACTS  
Pooling loan contracts introduce the possibility of a credit crunch – an overall collapse 
of the market for bank loans. The inevitable presence of type l borrowers may render 
lending unprofitable, thus inducing banks to withhold loans. As shall be shown in section 
III subsection B, monetary policy can play an active role both in the prevention and in the 
eventuality of a credit crunch. 
 
Credit market equilibrium  
Substituting c
i = w in equation (7) obtains type l entrepreneurs’ equilibrium demand 




























l l                                             (14)   
Credit market Nash equilibrium under pooling loan contracts is obtained in two stages. 
First, each bank sets a profit-maximizing debitory rate, taking as given the behavior of its 
neighbors. Then, if the maximized profit is non-negative, the bank chooses to provide 
loans; if the maximized profit is negative, it will refrain from lending. 
Bank i's profit under pooling loan contracts is obtained by deducing the loss inflicted 
by loans extended to type l borrowers from the gain on loans extended to type h 
borrowers: 
) )( ( ) )( ( w x L r x L





p − − − =
=
φ φ Π l l                                                                     (15)   
Due to the separability in solving for debitory rates and collateral requirements, the 
optimal debitory rates under pooling loan contracts are identical to the ones obtained 
under separating loan contracts: 
s p r r =                                                                                                                             (16)    
The equilibrium distance between a bank and its marginal type h borrower under pooling 
                                                  
11 Equation (14) indicates that under pooling loan contracts type l entrepreneurs’ demand for the loans of a 
single bank depends on the comparative values of α/n and G-w. The explanation for this is the following. 
The transportation disutility incurred by a type l borrower that is located in the midway between a bank and 
its closest neighbor is equivalent to a cost of α/2n units of capital, while the surplus she extracts is G-w units 
of capital. Hence, as long as α/n ≤ 2(G-w), all type l entrepreneurs that lie within 1/2n units of length from 
a bank would like to borrow from it, so that the demand for loans faced by each bank is (1-q)/n.  




h x x =                                                                                                                            (17)   




h x , 
p
h x ~  and  ) depending on the 




p xl  and  ), 
depending on the comparative values of α/n and G-w (see equation (14)). In the two-
dimensional [α/n , φ] space, let 
p xl ˆ











h x ~  and  =  ; 
p xl
p xl ˆ




h x  and  =  ; 
p xl
p xl ˆ




h x  and  = 
p xl
p xl ; 




h x ~  and  = 
p xl
p xl ; 






p xl ; 
Given that banks value only type h entrepreneurs as desired borrowers, market 
configurations under pooling loan contracts will be defined by . Thus zones I and VI 
are defined as monopolistic competition zones, zones II and V as intermediate zones, and 




Lemma 2: The number of pooling equilibrium zones in the two-dimensional [α/n , φ] 
space varies between four and six, depending on the comparative values of R and G-w: 
  23When 2(G-w) > R-1 there exist four equilibrium zones (zones I – IV); When 2(R-1)/3 < 
2(G-w) < R-1 there exist five equilibrium zones (zones I – V); When G-w < (R-1)/3 there 
exist six equilibrium zones (zones I – VI). 
 
Proof: see the Appendix. 
 





Figure 3: A Mapping of Credit Market Equilibria under Pooling Loan Contracts 
When 2(G – w) > R-1 
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Figure 4: A Mapping of Credit Market Equilibria under Pooling Loan Contracts 
When 2(R-1)/3 < 2(G – w) < R-1 
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Figure 5: A Mapping of Credit Market Equilibria under Pooling Loan Contracts 
When G - w < (R-1)/3 
 
 
  26The presence of type l borrowers may render lending unprofitable. Clearly, a bank 
will choose to extend loans only if it can make non-negative profits. Let  λ
p reflect a 













λ                                                                                       (18) 
 
The real effects of monetary policy under pooling loan contracts 
Given that only type h entrepreneurs can produce industrial output, the economy’s 
















λ                                                                                        (19)   
Using equation (12), can be expressed as: 
p y
s p p y y λ ≡                                                                                                                       (20)  
 
Equation (20) states that output under pooling loan contracts is identical to output under 
separating loan contracts with one reservation: unlike in the case of separating loan 
contracts, under pooling loan contracts the credit market may undergo a credit crunch – 
in which case output becomes nil. Thus, all the outcomes regarding the real effects of 
monetary policy under separating loan contracts (see section II, subsection B) hold under 
pooling loan contracts as well, yet, in addition, under pooling loan contracts tight 
monetary policy may cast the economy into a credit crunch.   
  27Monetary policy and the viability of the credit market 
The single bank’s participation constraint presented by equation (18) can be expressed 
as a stipulation on the level of the discount window rate, namely, that it does not exceed a 
certain threshold.  
 
Proposition 5: In each of the zones I - VI there exists a discount window rate threshold 
above which lending becomes unprofitable, so that banks are unwilling to lend. Thus, tight 
monetary policy that raises the discount window rate beyond its threshold level generates 
a credit crunch. Let  VI II I ψ ψ ψ ,..., ,  denote the discount window rate thresholds 
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Proof: see the Appendix.  
 
Proposition 5 states that under pooling loan contracts, banks will provide loans as long as 
the discount window rate is sufficiently low. The discount window rate is the banks’ per-
unit cost of liquidity, and therefore, the marginal cost of extending a loan. Thus, the 
higher the discount window rate, the lower the profitability of lending. For a sufficiently 
high discount window rate banks’ profits become nil. Any higher discount window rate 
would render lending strictly unprofitable and thereby induce the banks to withhold 
lending. Thus, the economy will undergo a credit crunch
12– an overall collapse of the 
credit market. The discount window rate threshold level is the discount window rate at 
which banks break even. Since banks’ profits depend on the configuration of the credit 
market, so does the discount window rate threshold. Therefore, each equilibrium zone 
yields a different discount window rate threshold.  
There are four different patterns for the discount window rate threshold, denoted by 
the subscripts a, b, c and d, depending on the comparative values of (G-w), q - 3
w) - q)(R - (1    
and q - 2
w) - q)(R - (1   . Pattern a applies when  w G   q - 2
w) - q)(R - (1 − ≤ and is given by the following 
                                                  
12 It is however important to stress that the present paper is not about credit crunch. The term credit crunch 
is used to refer to a case where both type h and type l entrepreneurs are credit constrained - a technical 
result due to the symmetry between banks and the focus on the short run (which is the appropriate time-
frame for the analysis of monetary policy changes).     
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Pattern b holds when      w G   q - 2
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Pattern c holds when      w G   q
w R q
q - 3
w) - q)(R - (1
) 3 ( 8
) )( 1 ( 9
−


















− − − + − − + − − −






w R w G q q w G q w G q
n IV
q













) )( )( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 2 ) )( 1 ( 2
) )( )( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 2 ) )( 1 ( 2
3
) )( 1 ( 2
3













ψ       (24) 
  30Finally, pattern d applies when  q - 3
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Figure 6 illustrate the above patterns. 
In the real world, the design of monetary policy is affected by a variety of 
considerations and goals
13. Although monetary policymakers are normally preoccupied 
first and foremost by inflation and the stabilization of shocks to the economy, they are 
also likely to take into account, to that degree or another, financial system considerations. 
It would be plausible to assume that monetary policymakers would refrain from actions 
that are bound to undermine the proper functioning of the financial system. Thus, it may 
be cautiously argued that monetary policymakers’ elbowroom in reacting to changing 
macroeconomic conditions is constrained by the concern for the proper functioning of the 
financial system
14. The discount window rate threshold in the model captures the extant 
by which monetary policy is constrained by credit market viability considerations.  
                                                  
13 Considerations such as the level of employment, the exchange rate, the integrity of the payment system 
and financial stability etc. are also likely to play a role in the design of monetary policy. 
14 Clearly, there is a variety of economic, political and social considerations that constrain monetary 
policymakers. The partial equilibrium analysis provided in this paper focuses on credit market viability. 
  31The discount window rate threshold is affected, among other things, by the 
compound structural parameter α/n. To shed further light on the relation between CMS 
and monetary policy, it would be worthwhile to examine the effect of α/n on the discount 
window rate threshold and see what values of α/n allow for maximal monetary policy 
elbowroom.  
 
Proposition 6: (i) Under perfect competition (α/n = 0) the credit market is not viable; (ii) 
under monopolistic competition the discount window rate threshold is rising in α/n; (iii) 
under the hybrid configuration, the discount window rate threshold is declining in α/n in 
zone II and rising in α/n in zone V; (iv) under local monopolies the discount window rate 
threshold is declining in α/n in zone III and invariant to it in zone IV. 
 
Proof: see the Appendix.  
 
Under perfect competition, banks make null profits from lending to type h borrowers and, 
at the same time, suffer loses over the loans extended to type l ones. Thus, on the whole, 
lending under perfect competition is unprofitable, and the banks choose to withhold 
lending. As the credit market moves away from perfect competition within the 
monopolistic competition zone, their potential profits from lending to type h borrowers, 
and hence, their overall profits rise; at some point, lending may become strictly 
profitable. Thus, under pooling loan contracts, some positive degree of concentration 
  32and/or differentiation between credit institutions is required for the credit market to 
function. 
Proposition 6 indicates that the relationship between the structural compound 
parameter α/n and the discount window rate threshold varies between equilibrium zones. 
Since the discount window rate threshold is defined as the level of the discount window 
rate at which banks break even, it increases in the profitability of lending. Thus, the 
direction by which α/n affects lending profitability is also the direction by which it 
affects the discount window rate threshold.  
 
Proposition 7: For all four patterns of the discount window rate threshold, there is a 
value of the compound structural parameter α/n that sustains both maximal monetary 
policy elbowroom and maximal output.  
 
Proof: see the Appendix.  
 
The effect of CMS on the extent to which monetary policy elbowroom is 
constrained by credit market viability implies a reciprocal relevance of banking 
supervision policy towards CMS and monetary policy.  
In the real world, the banking supervision authority’s concern about the structural-
competitive configuration of the banking system is normally attributed to two groups of 
considerations: (1) financial system soundness and stability and (2) consumer welfare. 
  33The concern for credit market robustness to restrictive monetary policy fits into the first 
group of considerations.  
In terms of the present model, banking supervision medium-long run policy can 
affect both the number of banks in the economy, n, and the extent of differentiation 
between them as credit providers, α. Therefore, in the context of the present model, those 
values of α/n that maximize the robustness of the credit market to restrictive monetary 
policy as well as the volume of successful loans should be preferred by the banking 
supervision authority.  
 
Figure 6: The Four Patterns of the Discount Window Rate Threshold  
  34 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The paper points to the relevance of CMS to monetary policy in the short run. It 
shows that under some conditions CMS affects monetary transmission and that in the 
case where creditors cannot screen out bad borrowers it also affects the robustness of the 
credit market to contractive monetary policy.  
Both the stance of monetary policy and CMS are found to determine the type of credit 
market equilibrium. When the credit market is highly differentiated and/or monetary 
policy is highly restrictive, banks act as local monopolies. In this case, due to the high 
compound cost of credit, not all productive entrepreneurs can access the credit market; 
thus, the economy-wide credit volume, and thereby real activity, fall bellow their 
maximal levels. This state of affairs calls for Central Bank intervention: by relaxing its 
monetary stance, the Central Bank can induce banks to lower debitory rates. The 
resulting reduction in the compound cost of credit to borrowers would thus expand the 
economy-wide volume of credit, and with it, real activity
15. This mechanism is 
reminiscent of the well known bank-lending channel of monetary transmission. Yet, 
unlike the bank lending channel, in which monetary relaxation expands the volume of 
lending by rendering relatively low-return projects profitable, in the transmission 
mechanism described in this paper monetary relaxation enhances the attractiveness of 
loans to “peripheral” entrepreneurs, who incur a higher credit accessibility cost, and who 
                                                  
15 It is important to stress that this result should not be interpreted as a recommendation for expansionary 
monetary policy, or any monetary stance whatsoever.  
  35previously refrained from borrowing due to the high compound cost of credit. Thus, 
whereas the bank-lending channel is driven by projects’ differential expected returns, the 
transmission mechanism generated in this paper is driven by borrowers’ differential 
credit accessibility costs - induced by the differentiation between banks as credit 
providers. Another important result pertaining to the local monopolies’ equilibrium is 
that the greater the extent of credit market differentiation, the weaker the intensity of 
transmission, or, alternatively, the larger the change in monetary policy required to 
achieve a given real effect.  
When the credit market is relatively little differentiated and/or the monetary stance is 
relatively loose, banks act as monopolistic competitors. Under monopolistic competition, 
the overall volume of credit attains its maximal level, so that a single bank cannot expand 
its market share without reducing that of its counterparts. Thus, monetary relaxation 
cannot enhance real activity. It is important to stress that had there been a range of 
technologies in the model, each yielding a different return, monetary policy would have 
generated real effects under monopolistic competition as well, through a traditional bank-
lending channel. Yet, even then, the real effects generated under monopolistic 
competition would have been weaker than the ones produced under local monopolies, 
which on top of the traditional bank-lending channel, involves a CMS-driven channel.  
Another outcome of the paper is that tight monetary policy can be conducive to a 
credit crunch. When potential borrowers have little wealth to pledge as collateral, banks 
cannot use collateral requirements as a means of screening out unworthy borrowers. The 
  36inevitable presence of such borrowers lowers banks’ profits and might even render 
lending unprofitable, in which case the banks would refrain from extending credit. Given 
that the cost of procuring loanable funds from the Central Bank negatively affects banks’ 
profitability, the Central Bank can play an active role in restoring banks’ profitability and 
the proper functioning of the credit market by loosening its monetary stance. In the same 
way, it may be the case that monetary tightening generates a credit crunch. Therefore, 
short-term monetary policy affects the viability of the credit market
16. In the light of this 
result, the Central Bank should be cautious when considering the use of contractionary 
policy, and take into account the structure of the credit market. 
Another implication of the paper’s outcomes pertains to the relationship between the 
depth of borrowers’ pockets and the eventuality of a credit crunch. In the model, 
borrowers’ wealth determines the maximal collateral they can pledge, and thereby, 
whether equilibrium loan contracts are separating or pooling. Since under pooling loan 
contracts contractive monetary policy may beget a credit crunch, it can be said that the 
model predicts a linkage between borrowers’ “shallow pockets” and the eventuality of a 
credit crunch.  Therefore, according to the model, poorer economies or economies 
undergoing an economic slowdown are more prone to credit shortages. This is a 
prediction that should be tested empirically in future research. 
This paper calls for follow-up research. The framework presented in the recent paper 
can be elaborated in many ways. One of many interesting directions for future research 
                                                  
16 It should be stressed that this result stems, among other things, from the symmetry between banks and 
lack of multi-period dynamic considerations in the present model. 
  37would be to check the long-run implications of the relation between CMS and monetary 
policy. In the long run, both the number of banks in the system and the degree of 
differentiation between them can be endogenously treated. The extent of differentiation 
between banks summarizes a variety of factors, among them banking system regulation 
and bank’s deliberate strategic differentiation policy. It would therefore be contributive 
to the understanding of the interactions between CMS and Central Bank policy to 
investigate the long run relationship between the number of banks in the economy, 
banking system regulation and the long-run monetary stance. Other elaborations of the 
present framework would be the introduction of a foreign credit market or the possibility 
of mergers and branching. It would be also interesting to bring the model to the data and 
check whether its predictions are confirmed.  
 
  38APPENDIX 
 
Proof of proposition 5: 
 






































































h                            (A1) 
By substituting equations (14), (16) and (A1) into equation (15) and using the definition 
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Equation (18) states that under pooling loan contracts, a bank will be willing to provide 
loans as long as its profits are non-negative. The condition for the non-negativity of a 
bank’s profit in each and every equilibrium zone can be expressed as a condition on φ, 
namely, that φ does not exceed a certain threshold:  
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  40Note that    iff  . Thus, unless the proportion 
of type h entrepreneurs in the population is sufficiently high, banks cannot make non-
negative profits in zone IV. 
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Proof of proposition 6: 
Proof of corollary (ii): by definition, both zones I and VI are monopolistic competition 
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Differentiating equation (21f) with respect to α/n obtains: 
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Proof of corollary (iii): by definition, both zones II and V are hybrid equilibrium zones. 
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Thus,  is rising in α/n iff 
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Proof of corollary (iv): by definition, both zones III and IV are local monopolies 
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Equation (A21) implies that   is rising in α/n if and only if the expression in the 
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  42Equation (21d) indicates that   does not depend on α/n. Thus, under local 
monopolies the discount window rate threshold level either declines in α/n (in zone III) 





Proof of proposition 7: 
Let  () () () c b a n n n α α α , ,   and  ( )d n α   denote the values of α/n that maximize 
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Both () a n α   and () b n α  yield a discount window rate threshold level that is located on 
the border between zones I and II where all type h entrepreneurs obtain loans, so that 
output reaches its maximal level. The lower support of the interval of α/n values that 
maximize  c ψ  and  d ψ  (given by equations (A25) and (A26)) yields a discount window 
rate threshold level that is located on the border between zones V and IV, where all type 
h entrepreneurs obtain loans, so that output reaches its maximal level. Higher values of 
  43α/n on that interval correspond to discount window rate threshold levels that are strictly 
within zone IV, so that only a share of type h entrepreneurs borrow (recall that under 
local monopolies the higher α/n,  the lower the share of borrowers in the type h  
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d n α  are depicted in figure 6. 
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